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MYSPACE, BUT WHOSE RESPONSIBILITY?
LIABILITY OF SOCIAL-NETWORKING WEBSITES WHEN
OFFLINE SEXUAL ASSAULT OF MINORS FOLLOWS
ONLINE INTERACTION
Legend has it that every new technology is first used for something
related to sex or pornography. That seems to be the way of
humankind. 1
I. INTRODUCTION
"Historians may one day mark 2003 as the year social relation-
ships were irrevocably altered."2 In 2003, two Internet entrepre-
neurs at MySpace.com ("MySpace") initiated "an original but
straightforward" idea.3 Recognizing that persons share a funda-
mental need to interact and bond with others, MySpace's founders
created interconnected personal web pages on the Internet where
individuals could fulfill this need.4 On these personal web pages,
users can create profiles that reveal interests, pictures, and journals,
as well as view other users' profiles, communicate with friends, and
meet new people.5 These personal web pages, located on websites
1. Exaggerated Promise, TORONTO STAR, Aug. 6, 2006, at DOI (quoting Tim
Berners-Lee, credited inventor of World Wide Web).
2. Karen Brooks, Look at Me, COURIER MAIL (Austl.), Aug. 19, 2006, at 53. See
generally Michelle Andrews, Decoding MySpace, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Sept. 18,
2006, at 48 (recognizing social-networking sites as new place where youths can
"hang out, gossip, posture, dare, and generally figure out how the world works").
"The difference [between online and offline social interaction] is that [online in-
teraction is] less physical and more word-based." Id. at 48-50 (quoting Danah
Boyd, Berkeley doctoral candidate studying children's online social practices).
3. Brooks, supra note 2, at 53. For a further discussion of MySpace.com's
2003 founding by Tom Anderson and Chris DeWolf, see infra notes 23-25 and
accompanying text.
4. See Brooks, supra note 2, at 53 (emphasizing that anyone with Internet ac-
cess and desire to connect can interact with others on social-networking websites);
see also Robert Crosnoe, Friendships in Childhood and Adolescence: The Life Course and
New Directions, 63 Soc. PSYCHOL. Q. 377, 378 (2000) (noting that, from develop-
mental perspective, friendships fulfill human need for intimacy and help children
refine "socioemotional skills" and "relationship templates"); John Cassidy, Me Me-
dia, NEw YORKER, May 15, 2006, at 50, 52 (recounting Facebook.com's founding by
Harvard student who tapped into "desire of hundreds of ambitious and impres-
sionable young people to establish themselves and make friends in an unfamiliar
environment"). But see id. at 55 (stating that users enjoy social-networking websites
because of voyeuristic and exhibitionistic, as opposed to networking, inclinations).
5. See MySpace Privacy Policy, Aug. 26, 2005, http://www.myspace.com/Mod-
ules/Common/Pages/Privacy.aspx (requesting users "display some personal infor-
mation to other members and visitors, which allows our users to identify each
(363)
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such as MySpace and Facebook.com ("Facebook") which contain a
creator's posted information, allow a range of viewing, from nearly
public to highly restrictive.6
While posting information on social-networking websites can
facilitate personal expression and relationship building, these sites
also create an environment in which adult sexual offenders easily
can initiate communication with potential child victims. 7 For exam-
ple, a fourteen-year-old girl and her mother currently are suing
MySpace, MySpace's parent company News Corporation, and the
girl's rapist for $30 million because the rapist first communicated
with the girl on MySpace. 8 With the commencement of this lawsuit,
and the recognition of countless other cases of adults sexually as-
saulting minors after initial interaction on MySpace, teens, parents,
other and expand their network of friends"); see also Andrews, supra note 2, at 58
(emphasizing students' tendencies to display photographs and descriptions of un-
derage drinking and marijuana smoking on MySpace); Brad Stone, Web of Risks,
NEWSWEEK, Aug. 21, 2006, at 76, 76 (highlighting penchant of students to post
profanity, threats, memories of sexual encounters, and photographs of drinking
parties on social-networking websites); Mourning on MySpace, CNN.coM, Feb. 15,
2007, http://www.cnn.com/2007/US/02/15/myspace.mourning.ap/index.html
(recognizing that social-networking website users often leave messages on de-
ceased users' "profiles-turned-memorials"). Cf Erin Binns, What Does the Web Say
About You?, STUDENT LAW., Feb. 2007, at 16, 16 (highlighting statistic that eighty-
five percent of respondent employers in National Association for Law Placement
survey "admitted to using search engines and social networking sites like MySpace
and Facebook to research candidates. And 59 percent of the employers reported
this practice as standard procedure."); Stephanie Francis Ward, MySpace Discovery,
A.B.A. J., Jan. 2007, at 34, 34 (stating that "[c]riminal defense lawyers use social
networking sites the most, usually to investigate witnesses ...."); Melissa Manware
& DaNica Coto, Web Profiles New Source for Police Investigations, CHARLOTTE OB-
SERVER, Dec. 6, 2006, available at http://www.charlotte.com/mld/charlotte/news/
16173616.htm (noting that police use photographs and other incriminating infor-
mation posted on social-networking sites to locate youths wanted for illegal acts
and to investigate suspects in criminal proceedings).
6. See Cassidy, supra note 4, at 52 (noting that Facebook's success stemmed
from restriction that members only can view profiles of other students at own col-
lege unless permitted by member at another school to list that member as friend);
see also id. at 54 (recognizing that Facebook users can choose from different privacy
levels to make own user pages accessible only to friends, to other undergraduates,
or to everybody at particular school); Andrews, supra note 2, at 54 (indicating that
all users can make their MySpace profiles private, thus allowing only creator's
listed friends to see creator's profile).
7. For a further discussion of instances of adults initially interacting with mi-
nors on MySpace and the minors' subsequent sexual assaults, see infra note 9 and
accompanying text.
8. See Doe v. MySpace, Inc., No. D-1-GN-06-002209, 1 (Dist. Ct. of Travis
County, Tex. filedJune 19, 2006) [hereinafter Plaintiffs' Original Petition] (stating
plaintiffs' claims for damages against defendants MySpace Incorporated and News
Corporation for negligence, gross negligence, fraud, fraud by nondisclosure, and
negligent misrepresentation and claims against Pete Solis for sexual assault and
emotional distress).
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and lawmakers cannot deny that relationships now exist in an alter-
native online world and communal responsibilities thus have
changed forever. 9
This Comment explores the liability of social-networking web-
sites when minors are sexually victimized after interacting with
adults in these online forums. 10 Section II provides the social back-
drop inspiring the birth of these websites and notes both minors'
prevalent Internet use and the Internet sexual predators' pervasive
nature and activities." Additionally, Section II outlines the tremen-
dous societal benefits and marketing opportunities that arise from
these sites.' 2 Noting that a fourteen-year-old is suing MySpace be-
cause an adult man initially communicated with her on MySpace
and subsequently raped her, Section III analyzes the likelihood of
9. See Brandy Brubaker, Danger on the Web: Sexual Predators Prey on Teens Who
Use Social-Networking Sites, DOMINION POST (Morgantown, W. Va.), Aug. 27, 2006
(reporting MySpace interaction followed by sexual activities: between fourteen-
year-old girl and twenty-seven-year-old man; between fifteen-year-old girl and
twenty-six-year-old man; between eleven-year-old girl and twenty-one-year-old man;
and between fourteen-year-old girl and thirty-nine-year-old man); see also Raheem
Hosseini, ACSO Apprehends Internet Predator; Suspect Used MySpace to Approach His
Victim, LEDGER DISPATCH (Amador County, Cal.), Dec. 8, 2006, at A4 (reiterating
incident of oral copulation of fifteen-year-old boy following interaction with forty-
eight-year-old man in MySpace chatroom); Carlos Sadovi, 3 Teens Held in Sex Attack
of Online Friend, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 15, 2006, at Cl (highlighting incident in which
adult and two minors contacted fourteen-year-old through MySpace, arranged to
meet her, gave her alcohol, repeatedly molested her, and abandoned her in alley);
id. (relaying charges against twenty-one-year-old for allegedly admitted sexual rela-
tions with fifteen-year-old); Press Release, Connecticut Computer Crimes Task
Force: Massachusetts Man Charged with Using Internet to Engage in Sexual Activ-
ity with Connecticut Girl, U.S. Atty's Off. Dist. of Conn., Aug. 1, 2006, http://www.
usdoj.gov/usao/ct/Press2006/20060801.html (noting twenty-six-year-old man
charged with engaging in sexual activity with fifteen-year-old after responding to
message posted on her MySpace profile and meeting her); MySpace Is Safe Despite
Reports, CEO Says, MSNBC.coM, Mar. 6, 2006, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/l17
02558/ (mentioning incident in which twenty-two-year-old traveled from New
Jersey to Connecticut to molest eleven-year-old girl in playroom while parents
slept); Pete Williams, MySpace, Facebook Attract Online Predators, MSNBC.coM, Feb. 3,
2006, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/11l65576/ (emphasizing sexual assault of
sixteen-year-old girl by man who found her work address on social-networking web-
site). See also generally Joe Garofoli, Families of Sexually Abused Girls Sue MySpace,
Alleging Negligence, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 19, 2007, at Al (highlighting four families'
suits against News Corporation because families' underage daughters met individu-
als, who later sexually assaulted the girls, on MySpace).
10. For a further discussion of specific instances of sexual victimization of mi-
nors by persons met on MySpace, see supra note 9 and accompanying text.
11. For a further discussion of the history of social-networking websites and
the Internet habits of minors and sexual predators, see infra notes 17-29 and 34-71
and accompanying text.
12. For a further discussion of the tremendous marketing opportunities avail-
able on MySpace, see infra notes 30-33 and accompanying text.
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her lawsuit's success. 13 Section IV proposes alternative avenues for
recovery within the girl's suit. 14 Section V discusses government re-
sponses to social-networking websites.' 5 Finally, Section VI con-
cludes that parents and social-networking websites should work
together to promote children's safety in using such forums. 16
II. A COLORFUL BACKGROUND
Considering that MySpace has over one hundred million regis-
tered users,17 and Facebook has over eight million registered
users,18 one cannot overstate the pervasive nature and rampant use
of social-networking websites. 19 MySpace alone accounts for eighty-
13. For a further discussion of the minorJulie Doe's rape, the minor and her
mother's lawsuit, and the likely outcome of the case, see infra notes 85-178 and
accompanying text.
14. For a further discussion of potential theories of tort recovery against
MySpace, see infra notes 179-201 and accompanying text.
15. For a further discussion of the recently passed Deleting Online Predators
Act, see infra notes 202-06 and accompanying text.
16. For a further discussion of the necessary collaboration between parents
and MySpace, see infra note 207 and accompanying text.
17. See Patricia Sellers, MySpace Cowboys, FORTUNE, Sept. 4, 2006, at 66, 68
(noting that MySpace reached one hundred million registrant milestone in early
August, 2006).
18. See Stone, supra note 5, at 76 (emphasizing site's particular popularity with
college students). Stone also notes that "[c]reating a page on a social-networking
site is now a cherished form of self-expression at universities around the world."
Id.
19. See Cassidy, supra note 4, at 53 (stating that MySpace's web traffic in-
creased more than any other major website in 2005, and Facebook had second
greatest increase in web traffic in 2005 among major websites); see also Kevin J.
Delaney et al., Facebook, Riding a Web Trend, Flirts with a Big-Money Deal, WALL ST. J.,
Sept. 21, 2006, at Al (noting that nearly nine million web users from U.S. visited
Facebook in August of 2006); MySpace Gains Top Ranking of US Web Sites, BOSTON.
COM, July 11, 2006, http://www.boston.com/ae/media/articles/2006/07/11/
myspace-gains-top-ranking_of usweb_sites/ (emphasizing MySpace obtained
4.46% of all U.S. web hits for week ending on July 8, 2006, thus surpassing Yahoo
Mail, Yahoo.com, Google.com, and Microsoft's Hotmail website and making
MySpace most visited website that week); MySpace Tops Yahoo for First Time, CNN.
COM, Dec. 12, 2006, http://abclocal.go.com/wpvi/story?section=business&id=4847
170 (noting MySpace website viewed 38.7 billion times in U.S. in November, 2006,
as compared with Yahoo Incorporated's 38.1 billion U.S. views within same time
frame); Rachel Rosmarin, The MySpace Bubble, FORBES.COM, June 29, 2006, http://
www.forbes.com/digitalentertainment/2006/06/29/myspace-network-facebook
cx rr 0629socialnetwork.html (presenting statistic that over seventy million Ameri-
cans, or nearly half of U.S. Internet audience, visited social-networking websites in
April, 2006). But cf Mark Sweney, YouTube Overtakes MySpace, GuARDIAN
(London), July 31, 2006, http://technology.guardian.co.uk/news/story/0,,1834
036,00.html (stating growing popularity of YouTube.com's video sharing website).
YouTube.com, which allows users to post videos for public viewing, recorded a
3.9% share of global Internet visits per day, in contrast to MySpace's correspond-
ing 3.35% share, throughout July 2006. See id.
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two percent of web traffic among hundreds of social-networking
websites. 20 MySpace records roughly 280,000 new registrants each
day.2 1 Having surpassed Google.com in web traffic, MySpace's one
billion-daily page views ranks second only to Yahoo.com.
22
A. MyHistory
After studying online dating forums and existing online com-
munities, MySpace founders Tom Anderson and Chris DeWolf be-
gan to investigate the possibilities of social-networking websites.
2 3
The two founders launched MySpace in 2003 by inviting local
bands and club owners to create and publish web pages to which
others could link as "friends."2 4 Anderson and DeWolf insisted on
an open environment in which anyone could join the community,
browse others' user profiles, and post their own information.
25
As MySpace swelled in popularity, major investors took no-
tice.2 6 Although Anderson and DeWolf feared losing the personal-
ity of their grassroots website and its growing culture, the two
founders could not ignore both the exceptional earning potential
in the sale of MySpace and the partners' need for capital to con-
20. See Sellers, supra note 17, at 68 (indicating MySpace's dominant market
share in social-networking category which also includes websites such as Facebook,
Friendster.com, Xanga.com, and Bebo.com); see also MySpace Gains Top Ranking of
US Web Sites, supra note 19 (highlighting Facebook's "distant second" claim on
7.6% of visits to social-networking websites).
21. See Spencer Reiss, His Space, WIRED, July 2006, at 143, 146 (comparing
number of MySpace daily registrants to large U.S. city's daily newspaper
circulation).
22. See Sellers, supra note 17, at 68 (revealing that MySpace hosts "2.2 million
bands, 8,000 comedians, thousands of filmmakers, and millions of striving, atten-
tion-starved wannabes").
23. See Sellers, supra note 17, at 70 (noting Anderson's recognition of social-
networking websites as founders' "next big bet").
24. See id. ("[C]reative people became ambassadors for MySpace by using
[MySpace] as their de facto promotional platform . .. ."); see also Andrews, supra
note 2, at 48 (noting MySpace's beginnings as place for musicians and artists to
meet and interact). "Friend" on MySpace:
doesn't necessarily have the same meaning ... that it does in the offline
world.... A teen may add a friend because she wants to receive bulletins
from this person .... Or the new pal could be someone who shares a
similar interest, such as the same hobby or sport. More troubling though,
some teens accept total strangers as friends in an attempt to boost the
total number of friends noted on their page and so appear popular.
Andrews, supra note 2, at 52.
25. See id. at 70 (recognizing users' abilities to control appearance and con-
tent of own MySpace pages).
26. See id. at 68 (highlighting Redpoint Ventures's $15 million investment in
MySpace in early 2005).
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tinue MySpace's tremendous growth. 27 In July 2005,28 the multi-
media conglomerate News Corporation ("News Corp.") paid $580
million for MySpace. 29 Recognizing that "MySpace has simply ex-
ploded since the deal,"30 many commentators agree that News
Corp. actually may have underpaid for the site.3 ' Because partner-
27. See id. at 70-72 (indicating Anderson and DeWolf's reluctance to sell
MySpace to News Corp. when News Corp. approached founders). "Suddenly, so-
cial-networking sites, as they are called, are starting to look like the latest incarna-
tion of the Internet's Holy Grail: an entry point onto the Web, where an owner can
sell [marketers] access to all the consumers that come there." Delaney et al., supra
note 19, at Al. Cf id. (forwarding report that Yahoo offered Facebook $1 billion
for site and later lowered offer). Yahoo instead offered to pay about $900 million
for Facebook. See Saul Hansell, Yahoo Woos a Social Networking Site, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
22, 2006, at CI (noting Yahoo's acquisition of other websites with social compo-
nent like photo-sharing website Flickr.com); see also Catherine Holahan, Yahoo
Keeps Its Eyes on Facebook, BUSINESSWEEK ONLINE, Sept. 22, 2006, http://www.busi-
nessweek.com/technology/content/sep2006/tc20060922-967099.htm?chan=tech-
nology-technology+index+pagejinternet ("Independent social networking sites,
such as Facebook, have become some of the hottest properties on the Web thanks
to an ability to engage the large, young Internet audiences with whom advertisers
want to develop lasting relationships.").
28. See Sellers, supra note 17, at 66 (stating date of sale of MySpace to News
Corp.).
29. See Marc Gunther, News Corp. (Hearts) MySpace, CNNMONEY.COM, Mar. 29,
2006, http://money.cnn.com/2006/03/28/technology/pluggedin-fortune (evi-
dencing selling price of MySpace as $580 million); see also Reiss, supra note 21, at
145 (highlighting News Corp.'s outbidding of rival Viacom, which was already well
into to negotiation process with MySpace).
30. Gunther, supra note 29. "MySpace's membership ... more than quadru-
pled [within one year after] the News Corp. deal . .. confounding predictions that
the new management would send members stampeding for the door." Reiss, supra
note 21, at 146. See generally Google to Pay $900 Million to Handle MySpace Search,
WALL ST. J. ONLINE, Aug. 7, 2006, available at http://online.wsj.com/aricle/SB115
498180133429011.html (promulgating recent multi-year agreement under which
Google agrees to power search functions on MySpace, provide text-based and
keyword advertisements, and pay MySpace at least $900 million).
31. See Gunther, supra note 29 (highlighting MySpace's status as second-most
popular website on Internet as measured in page views and noting that price for
advertising on MySpace's homepage is expected to climb to $750,000 per day).
Marketers presently pay under $600,000 per day to place an advertisement on
MySpace's homepage. See Sellers, supra note 17, at 72 (noting advertisers' current
price to advertise on MySpace's homepage is less than Yahoo's price to advertise);
see also MySpace Could Be Worth $15 Billion, REUTERS, Sept. 27, 2006, http://www.
newsmax.com/archives/ic/2006/9/27/211622.shtml?s=te (quoting Wall Street
media analyst's forecast that MySpace could have shareholder value of about $15
billion within three years). But seeAline van Duyn, Time Warner Chief Queries Internet
Prices, FT.COM, Sept. 21, 2006, http://www.msnbc.com/id/14941695/ (stating be-
lief of Time Warner's chief executive officer that, "'[v]aluations . . . put on those
[social-networking] businesses that currently make no money are astronomical
and you have to have a big leap of faith' .... ). For a further discussion of You-
Tube.com surpassing MySpace in terms of global Internet visits, see Sweney, supra
note 19.
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ships with eBay.com or Amazon.com are likely in the future,3 2
MySpace is assembling its sales force to draw national advertisers
and sell the information collected from MySpace users to compa-
nies wishing to target products to specific groups.33
B. MyUsers
MySpace attracts users of many ages.34 Thirteen percent of
MySpace users are minors, while over fifty percent of MySpace users
are thirty-five-years-old or older.35 According to the National
Center for Missing and Exploited Children ("NCMEC"), sixty-one
percent of children between the ages of thirteen- and seventeen-
years-old have posted a personal profile on a social-networking web-
site like MySpace. 3 6 Furthermore, over eighty percent of teenagers
32. See Sellers, supra note 17, at 72 (predicting several e-commerce arrange-
ments involving MySpace). Cf Aline van Duyn, News Corp to Sell Films Online, FT.
coM, Aug. 14, 2006, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/9d8e7e8a-2aeb-Ildb-b77c-0000779
e2340,_i_rssPage=6700d4e4-6714-1lda-a650-0000779e2340.html (forwarding pre-
diction that News Corp.'s Internet properties, including MySpace, will sell
downloadable Fox films and television content to gain market share of online films
and television downloads).
33. See Sellers, supra note 17, at 72-74 (revealing MySpace's current advertisers
including: Coke, Pepsi, Proctor & Gamble, major automakers, mobile phone carri-
ers, and film distributors). But see News Corp to Sell Films Online, supra note 32
("MySpace has yet to prove it can develop video advertising around its user-gener-
ated content and that it can work as a platform to sell other products."); Sara
Kehaulani Goo, Cleaning Up the Board, WASH. PosT, June 8, 2006, at DI (recogniz-
ing marketers' apprehensions of advertising on social-networking websites because
of nudity, vulgarity, and sex displayed and portrayed on websites).
34. See News Corp to Sell Films Online, supra note 32 (noting MySpace's particu-
lar appeal to users in their teenage years and twenties). For a further discussion of
the myriad ages of persons using MySpace, see Sellers, infra note 35, and accompa-
nying text.
35. See Sellers, supra note 17, at 74 (noting that fifty-two percent of MySpace
users are thirty-five years-old or older). But see Gunther, supra note 29 (highlight-
ing that, compared to users of MySpace, Facebook users are typically college stu-
dents); Justin Pope, Colleges Warn About Networking Sites, MSNBC.com, Aug. 2, 2006,
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/14155373/wid/ 11915829/page/i/ (emphasizing
that Facebook seeks membership by college students). Facebook originally at-
tempted to restrict access to its site by requiring an email address ending in ".edu."
See id. (noting Facebook registration requirement). Facebook has expanded, how-
ever, allowing access to those with an email address from a high school, college, or
participating company. See Age Verification at Social-Network Sites Could Be Difficult,
TECH. REV., July 17, 2006, http://www.technologyreview.com/read-article.aspx?id
=17177&pg=l&ch=infotech (recognizing Facebook's expanding use by persons
outside collegiate environment). As of March 2006, Facebook was the seventh
most-trafficked website on the Internet. See Michael Duffy, A Dad's Encounter with
the Vortex of Facebook, TIME, Mar. 19, 2006, http://www.time.com/time/magazine/
printout/0,8816,1174704,00.html (emphasizing Facebook's user registration limi-
tations as compared to open access of MySpace).
36. See Press Release, Nat'l Center for Missing & Exploited Child., New Study
Reveals 14% of Teens Have Had Face-to-Face Meetings with People They've Met
7
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use the Internet for at least one hour per day, and over sixty per-
cent of teenagers visit online social-networks. 37 Females are more
likely than males to visit and register to join social-networking
websites. 3 8
To join MySpace, "you answer a few questions, upload a photo
or two, and voild, you've got a MySpace profile."3 9 Potential users
must agree that they are at least fourteen-years-old to create a pro-
file on MySpace. 40 MySpace profiles of persons younger than six-
teen-years-old are automatically private;41 that is, only persons listed
as the sixteen-year-old's friends can view the minor's MySpace
page. 42 When registering for MySpace, however, "[m]ost teens
know how to get around the system," and so to appear older, many
"type ninety-nine as their age."4 3 MySpace employees who police
the website delete over 25,000 profiles of children under fourteen
years of age every week.44 Notwithstanding MySpace's efforts, when
a person registers for a MySpace account and provides their date of
on the Internet (May 11, 2006), available at http://us.missingkids.com/missing
kids/servlet/NewsEventServlet?LanguageCountry=enUS&Paged=2383 (observ-
ing that teenagers have established significant presence on social-networking web-
sites while exposing themselves to safety risks).
37. See Current Research You Can Use, BURSTMEDIA ONLINE INSIGHTS, (2006)
http://www.burstmedia.com/assets/newsletter/items/2006-05-01.pdf (highlight-
ing Internet usage and social-network access as regular part of teenagers' lives).
38. See id. (emphasizing different social-networking behaviors between the
sexes).
39. Andrews, supra note 2, at 48.
40. See MySpace.com Terms of Use Agreement June 15, 2006, http://collect.My
Space.com/misc/terms.html (requiring truthfulness of user's reported age to sat-
isfy registration eligibility). At one time, MySpace blocked access to those under
the age of sixteen. See Julia Angwin & Brian Steinberg, News Corp. Goal: Make
MySpace Safer for Teens, WALL ST.J., Feb. 17, 2006, at BI (recognizing that MySpace
claims to have computer program that searches for clues of users' age misrepresen-
tations). MySpace lowered the minimum age requirement to fourteen-years-old
because many registrants lied about their ages to gain access to the website. See id.
(noting some communication features still limited for users under age sixteen).
41. See Brandy Brubaker, Teen on MySpace: 'You Have to Be Careful,' DOMINION
POST (Morgantown, W. Va.), Aug. 27, 2006 (requiring teenagers under age of six-
teen-years-old to authorize every person who attempts to view their profile).
42. See MySpace: How to Hide and Make a Profile Private, TEcH-REcIPES.COM,
http://www.tech-recipes.com/rx/1159/myspace-how-to-hide-make-profilepri-
vate (last visited Feb. 20, 2007) (suggesting that MySpace users wishing to reduce
number of persons able to see user's profile list profile age as sixteen).
43. Brubaker, supra note 41 (noting lack of verification system which could
defeat dishonesty by users sixteen-years-old and younger). See also Age Verification at
Social-Network Sites Could Be Difficult, supra note 35 ("A [twelve]-year-old can quickly
mature to meet (a site's] minimum age requirements ....").
44. See Andrews, supra note 2, at 54 (reiterating that MySpace deletes profiles
of underage users); see also Gunther, supra note 29 (noting that about one-third of
MySpace's 280 employees work on site-related safety issues, including removal of
approximately 220,000 profiles since MySpace's inception).
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birth, that person must simply check a box indicating agreement to
MySpace's "Terms of Service" and "Privacy Policy."
45
C. MyRules
In June 2006, MySpace instituted heightened privacy man-
dates.4 6 These privacy rules prohibit adult access to the profiles of
fourteen- or fifteen-year-olds unless an adult provides the younger
person's full name or email address and the minor lists the adult as
a "friend. '4 7 Although prohibited, adults can register as fourteen-
and fifteen-year-olds, request friendship status with other fourteen-
and fifteen-year-olds, and gain access to the minors' full profiles. 48
To combat this problem, MySpace users of all ages now have the
option of allowing only limited viewing of their profiles.4 9
D. MyFriends
Social-networking sites are replacing the malls and burger
stands of past generations and serving as forums for persons to
communicate with others and develop self-identities. 50 Described
45. See MySpace Registration Page, http://signup.myspace.com/index.cfm?
fuseaction=join&MyToken=6da4557e-f8b0-4a09-9de8-68clc6e2d387 (last visited
Mar. 18, 2007) (requesting that users check box labeled, "By checking the box you
agree to the MySpace Terms of Service and Privacy Policy"); see also Gunther, supra
note 29 (acknowledging that MySpace does not currently employ technology for
verifying registrants' ages).
46. See Andrews, supra note 2, at 54 (recognizing MySpace's attempts to en-
hance safety and security of website).
47. See id. (reiterating that MySpace's lack of age verification allows violations
of these rules by persons misrepresenting their ages); see also Anick Jesdanun,
MySpace Plans New Rules to Thwart Predators, MSNBC.coM, June 21, 2006, http://
www.msnbc.msn.com/id/13447786/ (explaining cease of current mechanism by
which adult could simply request "friend" status with minor, thus allowing adult to
see minor's full profile). "Any user will still be able to get a partial profile of
younger users by searching for [attributes such as display name] .... [P]artial
profiles display gender, age and city." Id.
48. SeeJesdanun, supra note 47 (demonstrating how adults registered as mi-
nors can see minors' full profiles that often provide personal details such as hob-
bies and names of users' schools).
49. See Anita Ramasastry, A Fourteen-Year-Old Girl's Suit Against MySpace: Should
Networking Sites Be Legally Responsible for Protecting Teens from Harmful Real-World Con-
duct?, FINDLAw.coM, June 26, 2006, http://writ.news.findlaw.com/ramasastry/
20060626.html (emphasizing changes for both young and old MySpace users).
50. See Andrews, supra note 2, at 48 (revealing that teenagers spend hours
within social-networking virtual gathering spaces); see also Brooks, supra note 2, at
53 (noting that young and old are using Internet, as opposed to traditional gather-
ing places, to meet new friends); Duffy, supra note 35 (analogizing Facebook's role
as telephone, back fence, class bulletin board, and locker room). Research indi-
cates that: forty-five percent of youth spend an hour or less on the Internet per
day; thirty-one percent of youth spend between one and two hours on the Internet
per day; and twenty-three percent of youth spend more than an hour per day on
9
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as "infinite scrapbook[s]," social-networking sites allow users to
forge "a sense of self [by] creating a distinct identity and [allowing
self-promotion] outside the usual strictures of family, peers and col-
leagues."51 Personal pages on these social-network websites have
"metamorphosed to the equivalent of a personal advertisement," in
which "[c] rafting the most attractive and interesting version of your
'self,' like a sales pitch, guarantees a market."52 For many users,
social-networking sites serve as not only diaries and yearbooks, 53 but
also allow communication with persons one is unable to contact in
the bricks-and-mortar world.54 Many users recognize that social-
networking websites foster community building. 55 While on these
sites, users often retrieve messages others have left for them, as well
as visit friends' sites to look for new comments or changes in their
friends' profiles. 56 Experts have lauded social-networking sites as
communication channels for persons who have difficulty with face-
to-face contact and as a means of forming camaraderie among
often-ostracized groups such as homosexual youths.57
E. MyDangers
While fewer children are sexually solicited online as compared
to five years ago, the Internet remains a dangerous place for youth
to tread. 58 Since 2000, youth Internet users have experienced an
the Internet. SeeJANts WOLAK ET AL., ONLINE VICTIMIZATION OF YOUTH: FIvE YEARs
LATER 12 (Nat'l Center for Missing & Exploited Child. 2006) (presenting statistics
in which number of minors who used Internet for greater than hour per day in-
creased, while number of minors who used Internet for hour or less per day de-
creased over past five years).
51. Brooks, supra note 2, at 53.
52. Id.
53. See Stone, supra note 5, at 77 (reminding college students that informa-
tion "casually post[ed] one night might just last a digital eternity").
54. See Police: School Shooter Asked for Girls by Name, CNN.coM, Sept. 29, 2006,
http://cnn.com/2006/US/09/29/school.shooting/index.html (providing ac-
count of man believed to have researched high school girls on MySpace, arrived at
girls' high school to find them, taken six girls hostage, molested girls, and killed
one of them).
55. See Pope, supra note 35 (noting bonding among peers promoted by social-
networking websites).
56. See Andrews, supra note 2, at 50 (touting use of social-networking websites
as "more evolved way to communicate than a telephone or cellphone or [instant
message]").
57. See id. at 56-58 (noting that homosexual users can share their experiences
and fears with persons who have had similar experiences).
58. See WotAK ET AL., supra note 50, at 1 (stating that ratio of youths sexually
solicited online dropped from one in five in 2000 to one in seven in 2006); see also
Study Finds Decrease in Online Sexual Solicitation of Teens, DALLASNEWS.cOM, http://
www.dallasnews.com/sharedcontent/dws/dn/latestnews/stories/081O06dnnatnet
youth.f10e72.html (hypothesizing that decrease in online sexual solicitation is at-
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increase in unwanted exposure to sexual material. 59 Moreover, the
proportion of youth Internet users who received aggressive sexual
solicitations - that is, solicitations most likely to evolve into crimes
- remained constant.60 Statistics affirm that nine percent of thir-
teen- to fifteen-year-olds has met in person with someone known
only through the Internet, while twenty-two percent of sixteen- to
seventeen-year-olds have had such encounters. 61
F. MyPredators
Most teenagers do not want their parents to know about their
online behavior. 62 Many teenagers report that their parents know
"Ivery little' or 'nothing"' about their online activities. 63 This pa-
rental unawareness, created by youth Internet users' desires to keep
online activities private, fosters a breeding ground for licentious In-
ternet escapades.
The NCMEC estimates that about 50,000 sexual predators are
perusing the Internet at any given hour.64 Moreover, many regis-
tered and unregistered sex offenders live freely within the United
tributable to persons heeding warnings about online dangers). But see WoLaK,
supra note 50, at 1 (reiterating that aggressive solicitations, in which solicitors
made or attempted to make offline contact with youth, did not decline between
2000 and 2006). In the most recent study, four percent of youth Internet users
received aggressive online sexual solicitations. See id. (increasing from three per-
cent in 2000 to four percent in 2006).
59. See WoIAK, supra note 50, at 8 (recognizing that number of youth Internet
users exposed to unwanted sexual material increased from one-fourth of surveyed
persons to slightly over one-third of surveyed persons between 2000 and 2006).
60. See id. (noting that aggressive solicitation involved interaction that
threatened minor's offline existence whereby "solicitor asked to meet the youth in
person; called the youth on the telephone; or sent the youth offline mail, money,
or gifts"). The survey also reported a consistent number of distressing sexual solic-
itations - that is, "solicitations that left the minor feeling very or extremely upset
or afraid." Id.
61. See Press Release, Nat'l Center for Missing & Exploited Child., supra note
36 (indicating that thirty percent of teenagers have considered meeting someone
with whom they have had only online communication).
62. See AMANDA LENHART, PEW INTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECT, PROTECTING
TEENS ONLINE 15 (2005) (highlighting sixty-two percent of teenagers surveyed be-
lieve "most teen [ager]s do things online that [they would] rather their parents not
see").
63. Press Release, Nat'l Center for Missing & Exploited Child., supra note 36
(specifying that "thirty-three percent of [thirteen to seventeen-year-olds] reported
that their parents or guardians know 'very little' or 'nothing' about [the minors'
online activities]," while forty-eight percent of sixteen to seventeen-year-olds re-
ported such parental ignorance).
64. See Sadovi, supra note 9, at CI (highlighting estimated number of sexually
dangerous persons online).
11
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States.6 5 Attorney General Alberto Gonzales noted, "[b]efore the
Internet, these pedophiles were isolated," but "[t]hrough the In-
ternet, they have found a community."6 6
Research on online victimization reveals that troubled youth
and youth with high Internet use exhibit an increased likelihood of
sexual solicitation. 67 Online sexual solicitation is targeted at girls at
almost twice the rate of boys. 68 Children are younger than fourteen
years of age in one-in-four instances of online sexual solicitation.69
In these cases, juveniles perpetrated about half of the victimization;
adults perpetrated about one-quarter of the victimization; and, in
the remaining one-quarter of the cases, the victims did not know
the ages of their violators. 70 In instances of online sexual solicita-
tion, according to victims, men committed the victimization two-
thirds of the time.7
1
65. See Press Release, Nat'l Center for Missing & Exploited Children, Presi-
dent Bush Signs Landmark Sex Offender and Child Protection Legislation on 25th
Anniversary of Adam Walsh's Abduction (July 27, 2006), available at http://www.
ncmec.org/missingkids/servlet/NewsEventServlet?LanguageCountry=enUS&
PageId=2503 (noting presence of "nearly 600,000 registered sex offenders in
United States" and "as many as 150,000" unregistered sex offenders who have
failed to comply with registration requirements or are undetected because of law
enforcement's inability to trace them).
66. Alberto R. Gonzales, U.S. Att'y Gen., Address to the Employees at the Na-
tional Center for Missing and Exploited Children (Apr. 20, 2006).
67. See SHARON COOPER ET AL., MEDICAL, LEGAL & SOCIAL SCIENCE ASPECTS OF
CHILD SEXUAL EXPLOITATION 445 (2005) (suggesting that troubled youth and
youth with high Internet use and high risk behavior may have increased risk of
sexual victimization). A report on the characteristics of youth most likely to form
close online relationships stated:
a disproportionate number of adolescents with close online relationships
were highly troubled, reported high amounts of conflict with their par-
ents, low communication with parents and engaged in high levels of de-
linquency. Youth with these relationships also were more likely to be
[between the ages of fourteen and seventeen], non-Hispanic white, re-
port high levels of Internet use and have home Internet access.
Janis Wolak et al., Escaping or Connecting? Characteristics of Youth Who Form Close On-
line Relationships, 26J. ADOLESCENCE 105, 110 (2003) (citation omitted).
68. See COOPER ET AL., supra note 67, at 441 (noting that sexual solicitation
occurred when online persons asked minors to engage in unwanted sexual
actions).
69. See id. (recognizing that seventy-seven percent of online sexual solicitation
cases involved minors fourteen-years-old or older).
70. See id. at 441-44 (furthering that many sexual propositions to youths in-
volved cybersex, i.e., form of fantasy sex in which participants describe sexual acts
for arousal).
71. See id. at 442 (highlighting that males committed sixty-seven percent of
online sexual solicitation of minors; females committed nineteen percent of on-
line sexual solicitation of minors; and persons of unknown gender committed thir-
teen percent of online sexual solicitation of minors).
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G. MyAccusations
Ernie Allen, President and Chief Executive Officer of the
NCMEC, stated to the United States House of Representatives Com-
mittee on Energy and Commerce Subcommittee on Oversight and
Investigations that "child predators consider [social-networking]
sites to be an easy way to find child victims. They can use the infor-
mation posted by children to pretend to be someone with shared
interests, then develop a 'cyber-relationship' that can lead to [the
child's victimization]. "72 The United States Department of Justice
asserts, "the threat of sexual predators contacting children online,
with the hope of luring them to meet in person, has been amply
demonstrated .... 73
1. Attention from Attorneys General
State attorneys general now recognize the dangers inherent in
social-networking sites. Given the heightened media attention to
the dangers of social-networking sites, most specifically MySpace,
numerous state attorneys general have begun to pay considerable
attention to these online communities and their potential injurious
effects.7 4 Moreover, United States Attorney General Alberto Gonza-
72. Sexual Exploitation of Children over the Internet, Before the H. Energy and Com-
merce Oversight and Investigations Comm., 109th Cong. (2006) (statement of Ernie
Allen, President and Chief Executive Officer, Nat'l Center for Missing & Exploited
Children). See alsoAlberto R. Gonzales, U.S. Att'y Gen., Prepared Remarks at Sum-
mer Conference of National District Attorneys Association (Aug. 1, 2006) ("The
Internet provides elements that criminals love: a cloak of anonymity, speed of com-
munication and global access to potential victims."); Mary Wakefield, I Looked at
Her Page - and Felt Like a Pervert, SUNDAY TELEGRAPH (London), Aug. 6, 2006, at 22
(noting that pedophile can "gather material to create a convincing teenage charac-
ter for himself, or tailor-make a soul-mate for a particular victim, knowing that few
children will have the worldliness to see through his disguise").
73. OFFICE OF THE Arr'y GEN., PROJECT SAFE CHILDHOOD: PROTECTING CHIL-
DREN FROM ONLINE EXPLOITATION AND ABUSE 7 (2006).
74. See Age Verification at Social-Network Sites Could Be Difficult, supra note 35
(highlighting demands of state attorneys general on social-networking sites to en-
hance age and identity safeguards); see also AG Reilly Demands Changes to Xanga.com
Website to Protect Children from Online Predators, STS. NEWS SERVICE, Aug. 28, 2006
(indicating Massachusetts Attorney General Tom Reilly's demands of Xanga.com,
another social-networking website, to increase its minimum user age from thirteen-
to eighteen-years-old); AG: Xanga Needs to Protect Kids, CONN. POST ONLINE, Aug. 28,
2006 (noting Attorney General Reilly's demands of Xanga.com to implement "age
and identity verification system"). "[Attorney General Reilly] also wants Xanga to
increase the number of employees who review images and content on the Xanga
Web site and implement filtering technology that blocks sexually explicit images."
Id. (recognizing that Attorney General Reilly asked MySpace to also make similar
changes); see also Attorney General Comments on Simsbury Sex Crime Arrest Tied to
MySpace, U.S. FED. NEWS, Aug. 2, 2006 (quoting Connecticut Attorney General re-
garding case in which twenty-six-year-old man allegedly had sex with fifteen-year-
old he met on MySpace as stating, "[t]his case is powerful, real-life proof that al-
13
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les has emphasized the importance of Project Safe Childhood, a
national program designed to protect children from Internet
predators who use sites like MySpace to find and lure victims. 75
2. Lawsuits Against MySpace
Recent media reports spotlight incidents of children meeting
persons on MySpace and the subsequent sexual victimization of
those children. 76 In the most notorious case, a fourteen-year-old
girl claimed that a nineteen-year-old man first interacted with her
on MySpace and then raped her following offline contact. 77 The
minor victim, Julie Doe, and her mother, Jane Doe, subsequently
are suing MySpace, News Corp., andJulie Doe's rapist, Pete Solis.78
Julie Doe and Jane Doe seek $30 million in damages, 79 and claim
MySpace does not take sufficient steps to protect its underage
lowing children to mix with adults seeking sex is a recipe for disaster. It should
sound alarms at MySpace ... to better protect children from pornography and
sexual predators"); see also MySpace.com Subject of Connecticut Sex-Assault Probe,
FOXNEws.cOM, Feb. 6, 2006, http://www.foxnews.com/printer-friendlystory/0,
3566,183709,00.html (reiterating MySpace.com's stated commitment to collaborat-
ing with Connecticut Attorney General Richard Blumenthal regarding his con-
cerns of sexual predators on MySpace); see alsoJake Stump, MySpace.com Not Only
Risky Place on Internet, Officials Say, CHARLESTON DAILY MAIL (W. Va.), Aug. 7, 2006,
at ID (noting Texas Attorney General Greg Abbot's criticism of MySpace for its
failure to "impose safety measures to protect its users").
75. SeeJason Auslander, Child Predators Top Concern for U.S. AG, SANTA FE NEW
MEXICAN, Aug. 1, 2006, at Cl (reiterating that "([p]rotecting children) is more
important than anything we do").
76. For a further discussion of specific instances of sexual offenses of minors
following initial MySpace communication, see supra note 9 and accompanying
text.
77. See Plaintiffs' Original Petition, supra note 8 (describing progression of
relationship between Julie Doe and Pete Solis). For a further discussion of the
alleged facts of the progression of Julie Doe and Pete Solis' relationship, see infra
notes 86-91 and accompanying text.
78. See Plaintiffs' Original Petition, supra note 8, at 1 ("[Plaintiffs seek] dam-
ages against Defendants MySpace Incorporated and News Corporation for negli-
gence, gross negligence, fraud, fraud by nondisclosure and negligent
misrepresentation .... Plaintiffs also seek damages against Defendant Pete I. Solis
for sexual assault and intentional infliction of emotional distress.").
79. See id. at 22 (noting that Plaintiffs seek "[c]ompensatory damages of no
less than" $30 million).
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users.80 Cases such as Doe v. America Online, Inc.,8 1 James v. Meow
Media, Inc.,82 Zeran v. America Online, Inc.,8 3 and United States v. Car-
roll Towing Co.84 provide assistance in determining the outcome of
Julie Doe's claims in Doe v. MySpace, Inc. [hereinafter "Doe v.
MySpace"].
III. ANALYSIS: SUITS AGAINST MYSPACE AND THEIR
LIKELIHOOD OF SUCCESS
A. $30 Million Suit Against MySpace
According to the facts of the Plaintiffs' Original Petition
("Plaintiffs' Petition") filed in Texas's Travis County District Court
in Doe v. MySpace, Julie Doe created a MySpace profile during the
summer of 2005 at the age of thirteen. 85 Nineteen-year-old Pete
Solis ("Solis") later contacted Julie Doe on MySpace on April 6,
2006.86 Julie Doe, then fourteen-years-old, responded to Solis's
communications, and the two began to email each other.8 7 Follow-
ing Solis' request for Julie Doe's cell phone number, Solis andJulie
Doe had several telephone conversations.8 8 On May 12, 2006, Solis
met Julie Doe after school and later sexually assaulted her.89 The
80. See id. at 14 (arguing MySpace's knowledge of increasing occurrences of
sexual assaults on underage MySpace users). The Plaintiffs' Original Petition
continues:
[d]espite all the warnings, the numerous incidents of sexual assaults on
young underage MySpace users by adult MySpace users, and their widely-
publicized claims of safety to the public, MySpace has still not instituted
any meaningful changes or additional security measures to effectively in-
crease the safety of their young underage users.
Id.
81. 783 So. 2d 1010 (Fla. 2001).
82. 300 F.3d 683 (6th Cir. 2002).
83. 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997).
84. 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947).
85. See Plaintiffs' Original Petition, supra note 8, at 12 (emphasizing Julie
Doe's age of thirteen-years-old when she created her MySpace profile). At the
time Julie Doe registered for MySpace, MySpace prohibited registration by anyone
younger than fourteen-years-old. See id. (highlightingJulie Doe's ability to circum-
vent MySpace's age restrictions).
86. See id. (indicating that Solis first communicated with Julie Doe).
87. See id. (noting that Solis and Julie Doe engaged in "a series of emails").
88. See id. at 12-13 (highlighting Solis's previous fabrication of his status as
senior in high school and fabrication of his position on school's football team).
89. See id. at 13 ("In a videotaped confession, [Solis] admitted to initiating
contact with [fourteen-]year-old Julie [Doe] on MySpace, soliciting her personal
information, gaining her trust, and then sexually assaulting her.").
15
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Austin Police Department subsequently arrested Solis for sexual
assault.90
Julie Doe and Jane Doe [collectively "the Plaintiffs"] accused
MySpace of having "absolutely no meaningful protections or secur-
ity measures to protect young underage users from being contacted
by adult sexual predators on MySpace." 91 The Plaintiffs' Petition
asserted that MySpace has a strong financial incentive to encourage
children to use its website. 92 Furthermore, the Plaintiffs' Petition
alleged that MySpace lacked financial incentives to initiate signifi-
cant security measures. 93 For example, the Plaintiffs stated that
MySpace knew sexual predators contacted minors on the site, did
nothing to prevent this contact, and falsely claimed that the site
maintained adequate security measures. 94 The Plaintiffs based
their claims against the parties in fraud and negligence. 95
1. Fraud Claim in Doe v. MySpace
First, the Plaintiffs accused MySpace of fraud.96 In Texas,
fraud occurs when: (1) the defendant misrepresented a material
fact; (2) the defendant knew of the falsity of the misrepresentation
or made the misrepresentation recklessly without any knowledge of
its truth; (3) the defendant intended that the plaintiff act on the
misrepresentation; and (4) the plaintiffjustifiably relied on the rep-
resentation and thereby suffered injury.9 7 Here, the Plaintiffs can-
90. See Plaintiffs' Original Petition, supra note 8, at 13 (noting that Jane Doe
reported Solis's actions to police following day).
91. Id. at 14.
92. See id. at 13 (attributing MySpace's recent popularity surge to onslaught of
minor users).
93. See id. at 13-14 (stating that significant security measures would effectively
decrease number of MySpace users). "MySpace's interest is to ensure that access
to MySpace by young underage children remains effortless and unfettered." Id. at
14.
94. See id. at 14 ("Despite MySpace's knowledge of the increasing occurrences
of sexual assaults on young underage MySpace users by adult MySpace users, and
despite MySpace's express representations to the contrary, [MySpace does not em-
ploy] meaningful protections or security measures [to prevent adult predators
from contacting minors on MySpace].").
95. See Plaintiffs' Original Petition, supra note 8, at 1 (alleging specific claims
of fraud, fraud by nondisclosure, negligence, gross negligence, and negligent
misrepresentation).
96. See Ramasastry, supra note 49 (questioning whether MySpace acted fraud-
ulently because it lacked false or misleading statements or omissions).
97. See Ernst & Young, L.L.P. v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co., 51 S.W.3d 573, 577
(Tex. 2001) (listing elements of fraud). See generally 37 AM. JUR. 2D Fraud and Deceit
§ 23 (2006) (providing traditional elements of fraud: "a false representation; in
reference to material fact; made with knowledge of its falsity; with the intent to
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not claim that MySpace misrepresented the material fact that
MySpace is safe for minority users. 98
MySpace's "MySpace.com Terms of Use Agreement" [hereinaf-
ter "Terms of Use Agreement"] affirmatively stated, "MySpace is not
responsible for the conduct, whether online or offline, of any user of the
[w]ebsite or [m]ember of the [s]ervice." 99 Rather, MySpace at-
tempts to distance itself from its users' conduct by noting that it is
not responsible for any incorrect or inaccurate information on its
website. 100 The website's Terms of Use Agreement did not make
any false representations of material fact, but rather reiterated
MySpace's attempts to escape liability for the website's possible dan-
gers. 10 1 The Plaintiffs, therefore, fail to state a claim for fraud be-
cause they are unable to prove that the defendant misrepresented a
material fact.102
In addition, the Plaintiffs accused MySpace of misrepresenting
minors' safety on MySpace to the public. 10 3 While MySpace has
deceive; and on which an action is taken in justifiable reliance upon the
representation").
98. Cf Plaintiffs' Original Petition, supra note 8, at 17 (declaring MySpace's
representations as untrue, deceptive, and misleading).
99. MySpacecom Terms of Use Agreement July 16, 2005, http://home.att.net/
-rubberstamp/MySpace.html (emphasis added) (on file with author); cf. MySpace.
corn Terms of Use Agreement, supra note 40 (highlighting that similar section in
June 2006 Terms of Use Agreement minimally altered since summer Julie Doe
registered for MySpace).
100. See MySpacecom Terms of Use Agreement July 16, 2005, supra note 99 (em-
phasizing MySpace's freedom from liability for others' misrepresentations); cf.
MySpace.com Terms of Use AgreementJune 15, 2006, supra note 40 (espousing current
Terms of Use Agreement and noting only slight alterations to provisions in 2005
version).
101. See MySpace.com Terms of Use Agreement July 16, 2005, supra note 99
("Under no circumstances shall MySpace.com be responsible for any loss or dam-
age, including personal injury or death, resulting from use of the Website . . . or
any interactions between users of the Website, whether online or offline."). "IN
NO EVENT SHALL MYSPACE.COM BE LIABLE TO YOU OR ANY THIRD
PARTY FOR ANY ... DAMAGES ARISING FROM YOUR USE OF THE WEB SITE
OR THE SERVICE, EVEN IF MYSPACE.COM HAS BEEN ADVISED OF THE POS-
SIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGES." Id. "You agree to indemnify and hold MySpace.
corn, its subsidiaries, [and] affiliates ... harmless from any loss, liability, claim, or
demand, including reasonable attorney's fees, made by any third party due to or
arising out of your use of the [s]ervice in violation of this [a]greement .... Id. "I
HAVE READ THIS AGREEMENT AND AGREE TO ALL OF THE PROVISIONS
CONTAINED ABOVE." Id.
102. Cf FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b) ("In all averments of fraud ... the circumstances
constituting fraud . .. shall be stated with particularity.").
103. See Plaintiffs' Original Petition, supra note 8, at 6 (accusing MySpace as
presenting itself as place where adult MySpace users cannot contact fourteen- and
fifteen-year-olds).
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worked to improve the safety of its site, 10 4 it never has asserted its
absolute security. 10 5 In regards to accurate age verification meth-
ods, Chris DeWolf stated, "[n] o one on the Internet with a free site
has ever come up with a way to do that."'' 0 6
2. Fraud by Nondisclosure Claim in Doe v. MySpace
The Plaintiffs also stated a claim for "fraud by nondisclo-
sure."'1 7 In claiming fraud by nondisclosure, the Plaintiffs asserted
that MySpace concealed or failed to disclose material facts regard-
ing MySpace's lack of security and protection afforded to minors
using the website.1 08 Fraud by nondisclosure requires the defen-
dant to misrepresent a material fact, but the injured party can
prove this element by showing nondisclosure of a material fact
when there was a duty to disclose.10 9
104. See Angwin & Steinberg, supra note 40 (espousing News Corp.'s plans to
appoint "safety czar," launch education campaign involving schools and public-
service announcements, and restrict underage user access to certain MySpace
groups).
105. See MySpace Is Safe Despite Reports, CEO Says, supra note 9 (reiterating De-
Wolf s dual-assertions that "MySpace is a great place for all users over [fourteen]"
and that persons who endanger themselves with Internet predators would do so
elsewhere). DeWolf further stated that parents who teach their children social
safety in the offline world need to teach their children corresponding safety in the
online world. See id. (highlighting demands on parents).
106. Angwin & Steinberg, supra note 40.
107. Plaintiffs' Original Petition, supra note 8, at 18.
108. See id. ("MySpace had a duty to Plaintiffs to disclose [the lack of protec-
tion for young MySpace users] since [MySpace] knew their voluntary [and] partial
disclosures regarding the alleged security and protections in place for young un-
derage MySpace users was misleading, untrue, and created a false impression.").
There are generally four circumstances under which nondisclosure or conceal-
ment may constitute actionable fraud:
(1) when the defendant is in a fiduciary relationship with the plaintiff;
(2) when the defendant had exclusive knowledge of material facts not
known to the plaintiff; (3) when the defendant actively conceals a mate-
rial fact from the plaintiff: and (4) when the defendant makes partial
representations but also suppresses some material facts.
37 Am. JUR. 2D Fraud and Deceit § 200 (2006). To maintain an action for deceit by
reason of concealment, a claim generally contains the following elements: (1) con-
cealment of a material fact; (2) knowledge of the fact concealed; (3) intent to
mislead another into relying upon such conduct; (4) reliance; and (5) resultant
injury. See id. (listing requirements). "A crucial element in determining whether a
duty of disclosure exists, and thus whether a failure to disclose is a misrepresenta-
tion, is whether the mistaken party would reasonably expect disclosure." Id.
"[F]raudulent concealment requires some affirmative action, designed or in-
tended to prevent, and which does prevent, the discovery of facts giving rise to the
fraud claim." Id.
109. See United Teacher Assocs. Ins. Co. v. Union Labor Life Ins. Co., 414
F.3d 558, 567 (5th Cir. 2005) ("Courts in Texas have consistently held that fraud
by nondisclosure or concealment requires proof of all of the elements of fraud by
affirmative misrepresentation, including fraudulent intent, with the exception that
[Vol. 14: p. 363
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Even if MySpace had a duty to disclose the lack of protection
afforded its minor users,1 10 the Plaintiffs' claim for fraud by nondis-
closure would fail because the Plaintiffs cannot prove intent to mis-
lead."' In the complaint, the Plaintiffs reasoned that MySpace
"intended to induce Plaintiffs" to post profiles on MySpace by "deliber-
ately remaining silent and failing to disclose" the inadequacy of
MySpace's security measures for protecting minor users. 11 2 Intent
to mislead requires a showing that the party advancing the misrep-
resentation or concealing the material fact had the intent to induce
another to act on the concealment to one's detriment." 3
In the instant case, the Plaintiffs claim - that MySpace failed
to disclose to users the lack of protection afforded to minors -
should fail for want of: (1) concealment of a material fact and (2)
intent that users act upon the concealment of a material fact. This
fraud by nondisclosure claim should fail because of the information
provided in the Terms of Use Agreement effective when Julie Doe
created her profile. The Terms of Use Agreement reminded users
to "please choose carefully" the information posted on MySpace be-
cause it is accessible by other members.114 At the time Julie Doe
registered for MySpace, she asserted a false age of sixteen when she
was, in fact, "only [thirteen] years-old."' 15 Moreover, likely MySpace
does not intend to deceive users regarding MySpace's safety be-
cause MySpace has a financial incentive to ensure its members'
safety: if users feel unsafe on the website or the media portrays
MySpace as unsafe, users may stop frequenting MySpace. 116
the misrepresentation element can be proven by the nondisclosure or conceal-
ment of a material fact in light of a duty to disclose.").
110. See Plaintiffs' Original Petition, supra note 8, at 18 (accusing MySpace of
creating false impression of Julie Doe's safety).
111. For a further discussion of the elements of fraud, see supra note 97 and
accompanying text.
112. See Plaintiffs' Original Petition, supra note 8, at 19 (emphasis added) (ac-
cusing MySpace of deliberate deception to induce users to act on
misrepresentation).
113. See United States v. Watkins, 278 F.3d 961, 968 (9th Cir. 2002) (begin-
ning inquiry by noting that "intent to mislead is synonymous with intent to
deceive"). The court in Watkins further noted that deception is an essential ele-
ment of fraud requiring intent to induce a person to act on the misrepresentation.
See id. (noting necessity of deception for averment of fraud).
114. See MySpace.com Terms of Use Agreement July 16, 2005, supra note 99
(prohibiting registrants from displaying their telephone numbers, street addresses,
and last names for other users' viewing).
115. Plaintiffs' Original Petition, supra note 8, at 12.
116. For a further discussion of MySpace's ability to sell page space to adver-
tisers, see supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text.
19
Stedman: Myspace, but Whose Responsibility - Liability of Social-Networkin
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2007
382 VILLANOVA SPORTS & ENT. LAw JOURNAL
3. Negligence Claim in Doe v. MySpace
In their complaint, the Plaintiffs also accused MySpace of neg-
ligence.11 7 To prove a claim for negligence, the plaintiff must es-
tablish that: the defendant owed a duty of care to the plaintiff, the
defendant breached the duty of care; and the defendant's breach
of the duty of care proximately caused the plaintiffs damages.' 1 8
James v. Meow Media, Inc. provides a vehicle to explore the substan-
tive merit of this negligence claim. 119
In James, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Cir-
cuit affirmed the United States District Court for the District of
Kentucky's dismissal of the suit for failure to state a claim. 120 Al-
though the case also involved defendant firms that produced mov-
ies and video games, the Sixth Circuit devoted considerable
attention to the liability of the defendants' Internet sites.12' This
reasoning also applies to the Plaintiffs' accusations in Doe v.
MySpace.
a. Facts of James v. Meow Media, Inc.
In James, Michael Carneal entered his high school and shot and
killed several of his classmates. 122 According to the plaintiffs' com-
plaint, Carneal regularly played video games, watched movies, and
viewed Internet sites produced by the defendant firms. 123 The
plaintiffs argued that these activities desensitized Carneal to vio-
lence and incited his killing spree.' 24 While claiming that the distri-
bution of these materials constituted actionable negligence, the
plaintiffs also deemed the content of the video games, movies, and
Internet sites defective products triggering strict products
liability.' 25
117. See Plaintiffs' Original Petition, supra note 8, at 14 (noting negligence
claim); see also Ramasastry, supra note 49 (asserting that plaintiffs are more likely to
recover under negligence claim than under fraud claim).
118. SeeJames v. Meow Media, Inc., 300 F.3d 683, 689 (6th Cir. 2002) (listing
elements of negligence claim).
119. For a further discussion comparing the reasoning of James to Doe v.
MySpace, see infra notes 13940.
120. See James, 300 F.3d at 701 (affirming district court's dismissal of all
claims).
121. See id. at 687 (analyzing claims against certain sexually-explicit websites).
122. See id. (recounting facts of case).
123. See id. at 687-88 (listing Carneal's regular activities).
124. See id. at 688 (claiming material disseminated through these activities
influenced Carneal).
125. SeeJames v. Meow Media, Inc., 300 F.3d 683, 688 (6th Cir. 2002) (alleg-
ing three causes of action against defendant firms to recover wrongful death dam-
ages). The plaintiffs claimed that the defendant firms knew or should have known
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b. Necessity of Duty for Negligence Claim in James
The Sixth Circuit first found that the defendant firms did not
have a duty to protect the plaintiffs from Carneal's actions. 126 Af-
firming Kentucky's "universal duty of care" rule, 127 the Sixth Circuit
reasoned that one's duty of care is limited to exercising ordinary
care to prevent foreseeable harm.128 After analyzing the circum-
stances of the shooting, the Sixth Circuit declared Carneal's actions
not reasonably foreseeable to the defendant media manufactur-
ers.1 29 The court further reasoned that crimes are generally not
foreseeable and do not require a tort defendant to foresee such
incidents.1 30 Moreover, this occurrence did not present the ex-
traordinary circumstances requiring the defendants to anticipate
the third party's intentional acts.' 3 1
c. Necessity of Proximate Causation for Negligence Claim in
James
According to the Sixth Circuit, even if the defendants had a
duty to protect the victims from Carneal's violent actions, the plain-
that the distribution of their material to Carneal and other young people created
an unreasonable risk of harm to others. See id. at 688 (alleging that "exposure to
the defendants' material made young people insensitive to violence and more
likely to commit violent acts").
126. See id. at 689 (affirming determination of United States District Court of
District of Kentucky).
127. See id. at 690 (noting that under universal duty of care, every person owes
every other person duty to exercise ordinary care in his activities to prevent fore-
seeable injuries).
128. See id. ("[T]he defendant's duty is to avoid 'risks reasonably to be per-
ceived.'" (quoting Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Co., 162 N.E. 99, 100 (N.Y.
1928))). The existence of a duty of care is a "creature of circumstance. "James, 300
F.3d at 691.
129. See James, 300 F.3d at 693 (promulgating attenuated link between viewing
violence and committing violence).
130. See id. at 694 (recognizing that individuals are significantly deterred from
undertaking intentional criminal conduct given sanctions that can follow). Ac-
cording to the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS:
Normally the actor has much less reason to anticipate intentional miscon-
duct than he has to anticipate negligence. In the ordinary case he may
reasonably proceed upon the assumption that others will not interfere in
a manner intended to cause harm to anyone. This is true particularly
where the intentional conduct is a crime, since under ordinary circum-
stances it may reasonably be assumed that no one will violate the criminal
law.
§ 302B, Cmt. d (1965).
131. See James, 300 F.3d at 694 ("Courts have held, under extremely limited
circumstances, that individuals, notwithstanding their relationship with the victims
of third-party violence, can be liable when their affirmative actions 'create a high
degree of risk of [the third party's] intentional misconduct.'" (quoting RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 302B, Cmt. e.H. (1965))).
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tiffs did not establish proximate causation.' 3 2 If it had found a
duty, the Sixth Circuit stated it would likely hold Carneal's inten-
tional, violent actions a superseding cause of the plaintiffs' injuries,
thus severing the defendants' liability for the deaths of Carneal's
victims. 1 33 The Sixth Circuit reasoned that the unforeseeable, idio-
syncratic nature of Carneal's reaction to the defendants' media
compelled this holding. 34
d. Application of Products Liability to Internet Sites in James
According to the James court, the plaintiffs failed to prove that
video games, movies, and Internet sites constituted "products" for
purposes of strict products liability. 135 The Sixth Circuit reaffirmed
precedent holding that communicated words and pictures do not
constitute "products."'1 6 Also, the Sixth Circuit rejected the con-
tention that the words and images purveyed through tangible video-
cassettes, video game cartridges, and "electronic pulses" of the
Internet constituted "products.' 1 7 The Sixth Circuit specifically
found that, "[I]nternet transmissions are not sufficiently 'tangible'
to constitute products in the sense of their communicative
content."138
4. Discernment of Duty in Doe v. MySpace
Applying the reasoning in James - that the foreseeability of
the harm determines the scope of a party's duty of care - MySpace
owes its minor users a duty of care to enact reasonable safety mea-
sures to protect them from offline sexual victimization. It is fore-
seeable that children will, through using MySpace, meet offline
with individuals who will sexually assault them. Common knowl-
edge, numerous reported cases, and a growing number of academic
studies reveal that pedophiles often troll the Internet, thus evidenc-
132. See James, 300 F.3d at 699 (finding plaintiffs did not allege sufficient facts
on issue of proximate cause for prima facie negligence case).
133. See id. (reasoning that third-party's criminal action directly causing all
damages will break chain of causation).
134. See id. at 700 (noting unpredictability of Carneal's actions).
135. See id. (reiterating rule that, "[u]nder Kentucky law, manufacturers, dis-
tributors, and retailers of 'products' are strictly liable for damages caused by 'de-
fects' in those products").
136. See id. at 700-01 (reasoning that plaintiffs failed to meet burden of prov-
ing that video games, movies, and Internet sites are "products" for purposes of
strict products liability).
137. See James, 300 F.3d at 701 (noting that courts have reasoned that tangible
containers of ideas are products distinct from their communicative element for
purposes of strict products liability).
138. Id.
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ing the foreseeability of offline sexual assault. 13 9 Moreover,
MySpace's status as a social-networking website envisages interactions
beyond the bounds of the Internet, i.e., in the offline world. In Doe
v. MySpace, MySpace breached this duty by failing to implement ad-
equate security measures in light of the numerous offline sexual
encounters between minors and adults following relations on the
site. 140
5. Proximate Causation in Doe v. MySpace
Courts must limit legal responsibility to those causes so closely
connected with the injury and of such significance that the law is
justified in imposing liability.14 1 Proximate causation analysis in-
volves the determination of whether the policy of the law will ex-
tend responsibility to the defendant for the consequences of the
defendant's actions. 142 Even if MySpace owed its minor users a duty
of care to protect the minors from offline sexual victimization, and
MySpace breached this obligation, MySpace will escape liability if its
actions did not proximately cause Julie Doe's sexual assault.1 4 3
a. Whether MySpace Proximately Caused Julie Doe's Injuries
The stated policy of the Federal Communications Decency Act
("CDA") counters assertions that MySpace proximately caused Julie
Doe's injuries.14 4 In the CDA, Congress found that: (1) the In-
139. For a further discussion of online sexual solicitation studies and statistics,
see supra notes 58-71 and accompanying text.
140. For a further discussion of cases of sexual assaults of minors after minors
met persons on MySpace and other social-networking sites, see supra note 9 and
accompanying text.
141. See WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 237 (West
Publ'g Co. 1971) (1941) (reasoning that legal policy, derived from social ideas of
justice, must establish liability for consequences of any act).
142. See id. at 244 (forwarding that determination of proximate cause should
include questioning whether conduct is so significant and important as to hold
defendant legally responsible).
143. For a list of the requirements of negligence, see supra note 118 and ac-
companying text.
144. See Communications Decency Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C.A. § 230(b) (1998)
[hereinafter "CDA"] (listing Congress's Internet findings and policies). In the
CDA, Congress asserts:
It is the policy of the United States: (1) to promote the continued develop-
ment of the Internet... ; (2) to preserve the vibrant and competitive free
market that presently exists for the Internet . . . ; (3) to encourage the
development of technologies which maximize user control over what infor-
mation is received by individuals, families, and schools who use the In-
ternet... ; (4) to remove disincentives for the development and utilization
of blocking and filtering technologies that empower parents to restrict
their children's access to objectionable or inappropriate online material;
and (5) to ensure vigorous enforcement of Federal criminal laws to deter
23
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ternet improves the availability of educational and informational re-
sources for many Americans; (2) interactive computer services offer
users exceptional control over the information they receive; (3) the
Internet and interactive computer services provide an environment
for diverse political discussions, unique opportunities for cultural
development, and alternative avenues for intellectual activity; (4)
the Internet has thrived with minimal government regulation to the
benefit of all Americans; and (5) Americans increasingly use inter-
active media for a variety of political, educational, cultural, and en-
tertainment services. 145 Through the CDA, Congress explicitly
stated the United States' policy of both promoting the development
of the Internet while ensuring vigorous enforcement of federal
criminal laws. 146 In the CDA, Congress noted the United States'
policy of encouraging technology development to maximize user
control over the online information received by individuals, fami-
lies, and schools. 147 Congress further sought to remove disincen-
and punish trafficking in obscenity, stalking, and harassment by means of
computer.
Id. (emphasis added).
145. See 47 U.S.C.A. § 230 (presenting Congress's findings on Internet usage).
Congress enacted section 230 to respond to the New York state court decision
Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Services Co. See Doe v. Am. Online, Inc., 783 So. 2d
1010, 1014 (Fla. 2001) (highlighting Congressional response to Stratton Oakmont,
Inc. case). In Stratton Oakmont, Inc., the plaintiffs sued Prodigy, Inc. ("Prodigy") for
defamatory comments made by an unidentified party on one of Prodigy's online
message boards. See Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., 1995 WL
323710, at *4 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995) (explaining claim). The court held
Prodigy to the strict liability standard normally applied to original publishers of
defamatory statements. See id. ("Prodigy's conscious choice, to gain the benefits of
editorial control, has opened it up to a greater liability. .. ."). The court thus
rejected Prodigy's claims that the lower "knowledge" standard, usually reserved for
a distributor, applied to Prodigy's actions. See id. at *2 ("[D]istributors such as
book stores and libraries may be liable for defamatory statements of others only if
they knew or had reason to know of the defamatory statement at issue."). The
court reasoned that Prodigy's actions more closely resembled those of a publisher
because it not only advertised its practice of controlling content on its service, but
also actively screened and edited messages posted on its bulletin boards. See id. at
*4 (highlighting Prodigy's "role [in] determining what is proper for its members
to post and read on its bulletin boards."). In addition, Jonathan Zittrain has
explained:
The brief but intense history of American judicial and legislative confron-
tation with problems caused by the online world has demonstrated a cer-
tain wisdom: a reluctance to intervene in ways that dramatically alter
online architectures . .. [and] a refusal to allow unambiguously damag-
ing activities to remain unchecked if there is a way to curtail them.
Jonathan Zittrain, A History of Online Gatekeeping, 19 HAjv. J.L. & TECH. 253, 253
(2006).
146. See 47 U.S.C.A. § 230(b) (listing crimes such as obscenity, stalking, and
harassment).
147. See id. (emphasizing United States' policy of self-determination on
Internet).
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tives for the development and use of filtering technologies that
allow parents to restrict children's access to objectionable online
material. 14 8 Cases interpreting the CDA affirm Congress's policy of
reducing restrictions on Internet activities. 149
b. Precedent Interpreting Communications Decency Act and
Proximate Cause Analysis
In Zeran v. America Online, Inc., the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Fourth Circuit held that the CDA barred the plaintiffs
defamation claim against America Online ("AOL"). 150 In this case,
AOL delayed in removing an unidentifiable third party's defama-
tory messages posted on an AOL message board. 15 1 AOL also re-
fused to post retractions of these messages and failed to screen for
subsequent similar postings. 152 The Fourth Circuit reasoned that
148. See id. (empowering parents to determine children's Internet activities).
149. Two cases, Stratton Oakmont and Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc., influ-
enced Congress to pass CDA. See Doe v. Am. Online, Inc., 783 So. 2d 1010, 1013-14
(Fla. 2001) (citing Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y.
1991), Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., 1995 WL 323710 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. May 24, 1995) (noting cases' use for understanding Congressional intent in
passing CDA). In a claim for defamation in Cubby, the court held that Com-
puServe merely distributed information by providing its subscribers access to elec-
tronic news publications. See Cubby, Inc., 776 F. Supp. at 140 (referring to
CompuServe as "electronic news distributor"). An independent party had placed
false statements defamatory to the plaintiffs in CompuServe's Journalism Forum.
See id. at 138 (stating plaintiffs' claims). The court reasoned that it could not hold
CompuServe liable for libelous statements made in news publications absent a
showing of CompuServe's actual knowledge of the statements. See id. at 141 ("Be-
cause CompuServe, as a news distributor, may not be held liable if it neither knew
nor had reason to know of the allegedly defamatory [ ] statements, summary judg-
ment in favor of CompuServe on the libel claim is granted.").
150. See 129 F.3d 327, 335 (4th Cir. 1997) (affirming United States District
Court for District of Virginia).
151. See Personal Boards, http://www.personalboards.com/ (last visited Jan.
12, 2007) (defining "message board" as forum on Internet, much like bulletin
board, where person posts or sends messages that are subsequently available for
other Internet users to read and reply with comments).
152. See Zeran, 129 F.3d at 329 (noting unknown person's posting on America
Online [hereinafter "AOL"] message board advertising "Naughty Oklahoma T-
Shirts"). The shirts featured "offensive and tasteless slogans related to the April
19, 1995, bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City."
Id. The posting instructed persons interested in purchasing a shirt to call plain-
tiffs home. See id. (detailing posting on message board). Plaintiff did not know
about the shirts or messages on the bulletin board until he investigated the calls.
See id. (highlighting plaintiffs ignorance of message board post). Plaintiff in-
formed an AOL representative of the hoax and the representative assured him that
AOL would remove the false postings. See id. (emphasizing plaintiff's attempt to
have AOL remove disruptive posting from AOL message board). The false post-
ings continued, and persons enraged by the postings called the plaintiff about
once every two minutes. See id. (stating posting's disruptive effect on plaintiffs
life).
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the CDA created a federal immunity to any cause of action that
would make Internet service providers liable for information
originating with a third-party user of the service. 153 According to
the Fourth Circuit, Congress, in writing the CDA, recognized the
threat tort-based lawsuits posed to freedom of speech and the free
flow of ideas on the Internet.154 The court further reasoned that
Congress enacted the CDA to preserve the dynamic nature of In-
ternet communications and, accordingly, to minimize government
interference with this medium.' 55 The Zeran court highlighted
Congress's findings, espoused in the CDA, that the Internet has
"'flourished, to the benefit of all Americans, with a minimum of gov-
ernment regulation.'",56 Finally, the Fourth Circuit noted that the
policy of the CDA does not allow the party who posted a defamatory
online message to escape offline liability.' 57 Nonetheless, the
Fourth Circuit stated, "Congress made a policy choice . . . not to
deter harmful online speech through [the imposition of] tort liabil-
ity on companies that serve as intermediaries for other parties' po-
tentially injurious messages. "158
Using much of the reasoning from Zeran, the Supreme Court
of Florida in Doe v. AOL, Inc. determined that AOL acted as a pub-
lisher of defamatory materials and thus received immunity under
153. See id. at 330 (noting that providers and users of interactive computer
service are not publishers or speakers of any information provided by another in-
formation content provider according to section 230). Section 230 defines "inter-
active computer service" as "any information service, system, or access software
provider that provides or enables computer access by multiple users to a computer
server, including specifically a service or system that provides access to the Internet
and such systems operated or services offered by libraries or educational institu-
tions." 47 U.S.C.A. § 230(e) (2). Section 230 defines "information content pro-
vider" as "any person or entity that is responsible, in whole or in part, for the
creation or development of information provided through the Internet or any
other interactive computer service." 47 U.S.C.A. § 230(e) (3). The parties here
did not dispute that AOL constituted an "interactive computer service" and the
unidentified third party who posted the offensive messages constituted an "infor-
mation content provider." See Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330 n.2, 331 (noting plaintiffs
argument that, "computer service providers like AOL are normally considered in-
stead to be distributors, like traditional news vendors or book sellers.").
154. See Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330 (noting Congress's belief that imposing tort
liability on service providers for third party communications represented another
form of intrusive government regulation of speech).
155. See id. (highlighting Internet's role as forum for political, cultural, and
intellectual development).
156. Id. (quoting 47 U.S.C.A. § 230(a) (4)).
157. See id., 129 F.3d at 330 (reinforcing Congress's stated goals of upholding
criminal laws to deter crimes committed over computer).
158. Id.
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the CDA.159 In Doe v. AOL, a mother sued Richard Lee Russell and
AOL for her son's emotional injuries.160 Russell had lured her son,
then eleven-years-old, into engaging in sexual activities with other
male youths and with Russell. 16' Russell photographed and video-
taped these acts and used AOL's chat rooms to market this
pornography. 162
The Supreme Court of Florida began its analysis of the certi-
fied questions by noting in dicta that distributor liability is merely a
subset of publisher liability, and if AOL is a distributor, it receives
immunity under the CDA because of overarching immunity
granted to publishers. 163 This court further held that AOL is a pub-
lisher, not a distributor, and is thus protected by AOL's grant of
immunity under the CDA.164 Both Zeran and Doe v. AOL, in grant-
ing immunity to AOL, provide structure for the analysis in Doe v.
MySpace.
c. Policy of Communications Decency Act and Proximate Cause
Proximate cause analysis involves deciding whether a law's pol-
icy will extend responsibility to a defendant for an injury to the con-
sequences of the defendant's act.165 In both Zeran and Doe v. AOL,
the courts classified AOL as an interactive computer service pro-
vider. 166 While MySpace likely is better classified as an "access
159. See Doe v. Am. Online Inc., 783 So. 2d 1010, 1017 (Fla. 2001) [hereinaf-
ter Doe v. AOL] (finding that section 230 preempts Florida law with respect to
negligence cause of action). The plaintiff sued AOL as negligent per se for violat-
ing a Florida statute. See id. The plaintiff also claimed AOL's negligence in al-
lowing Russell to sell or arrange to sell child pornography, thus aiding in the sale
and distribution of child pornography. Id. at 1012.
160. See id. at 1011 (claiming emotional injuries caused by AOL in providing
place for persons to advertise child's pornographic videos and pictures).
161. See id. (describing facts of case).
162. See Internet Glossary, http://www.dwarfnet.com/glossary/chatroom.
shtml (last visited Oct. 12, 2006) (defining "chat room" as online space where per-
sons can communicate with each other via simultaneous typing with one another).
See Doe v. AOL, 783 So. 2d at 1011 (forwarding facts of case).
163. See Doe v. AOL, 783 So. 2d at 1017 (disagreeing with plaintiff's assertion
in Zeran that distributors are not publishers for purposes of CDA and thus do not
receive its immunity).
164. See id. (reasoning that AOL is publisher because it is "'in the business of
making their facilities available to disseminate the writings composed . . . and the
information gathered by others"').
165. For a further discussion of proximate cause analysis, see supra notes 142-
43 and accompanying text.
166. See Zeran, 129 F.3d 327, 328-29 (4th Cir. 1997) (noting that AOL's ser-
vices "offer not only connection to the Internet... but also allow their subscribers
to access information communicated and stored only on each computer service's
individual proprietary network"); see also Doe v. AOL, 783 So. 2d at 1011 (querying
389
27
Stedman: Myspace, but Whose Responsibility - Liability of Social-Networkin
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2007
390 VILLANOVA SPORTS & ENT. LAW JOURNAL
software provider" under the CDA, the policy considerations of the
CDA remain applicable. 16
7
In both Zeran and Doe v. AOL, the actual tort (i.e., the making
of a defamatory statement) occurred on the defendant AOL's web-
site. 168 In instances of sexual victimization resulting from meeting
persons on MySpace, the injury is further removed from the defen-
dant's website. While the first interaction occurred on the MySpace
webpage, Julie Doe's rape occurred only after the minor and adult
took additional steps and met offline 1 69 For these reasons, the
CDA's policy supports the finding that MySpace did not proxi-
mately cause plaintiff Julie Doe's injuries, and therefore MySpace is
not liable for negligence or gross negligence.
d. One Common Economic Analysis of Negligence
Judge Learned Hand created the legal standard applicable to
most negligence cases in United States v. Carroll Towing Co.: a defen-
dant is negligent if the loss caused by the accident, multiplied by
the probability of the accident's occurrence, exceeds the cost on a
defendant to avoid the accident.1 70 Under this formula, the loss
multiplied by the probability of the accident is the expected acci-
dent cost. 171 "If a larger cost could have been avoided by incurring
a smaller cost, efficiency requires that the smaller cost be
incurred."17 2
whether computer service provider with notice of defamatory third party posting is
entitled to immunity under section 230 of CDA).
167. See 47 U.S.C.A. § 230(e) (4) (1996) (defining "access software provider"
as "provider of software (including client or server software), or enabling tools that
do any one or more of the following: (A) filter, screen, allow, or disallow content;
(B) pick, choose, analyze, or digest content; or (C) transmit, receive, display, for-
ward, cache, search, subset, organize, reorganize, or translate content"). For a fur-
ther discussion of Internet communication policy in the United States under the
CDA, see supra notes 146-49 and accompanying text.
168. See Zeran, 129 F.3d at 329 (forwarding posting by unidentified party ad-
vertising plaintiffs false sale of offensive and tasteless shirts); see also Doe v. AOL,
783 So. 2d at 1011-12 (noting presence of defamatory third-party posting advertis-
ing sale of pornographic images of plaintiff's minor son).
169. For a further discussion of the online and subsequent offline interaction
between Julie Doe and Solis, see supra notes 86-90 and accompanying text.
170. See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947)
(stating formula in algebraic terms: "if the probability be called P; the injury, L;
and the burden, B; liability depends upon whether B is less than L multiplied by P:
i.e., whether B < PL.").
171. See icHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYsIs OF LAw 122 (Little, Brown and
Company 1977) (2d ed. 1972) (reasoning that accident costs are costs avoided by
precautions).
172. Id.
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The import of the rule is that a party is required to bear a cost
to prevent a loss, if that cost is less than the expected loss's cost. In
Julie and Jane Doe's claims of MySpace's negligence, the Plaintiffs
argued that MySpace breached its duty to Julie Doe by failing to
institute and enforce security measures and policies that would
"substantially decrease the likelihood of danger and harm that
MySpace posed to her.'u 7 3 Applying this formula to the Plaintiffs'
claim, MySpace should implement protections for minors when the
cost of the protections is less than the expected loss to the minors.
In determining whether MySpace acted negligently, one needs
to consider the potential implementation costs of additional protec-
tions. First, at one extreme, MySpace could have blocked access by
everyone under the age of eighteen by requiring a credit card num-
ber for registration.174 The burden of this protection, however, is
too great. Noting the high number of persons using MySpace
under the age of eighteen, MySpace would lose many of its users,
including advertisers who target that specific age group. 175 Moreo-
ver, MySpace users under the age of eighteen would lose the social
utility gained in using the site.
As an intermediate position, MySpace also could have man-
dated parental creation of MySpace accounts for minors. By requir-
ing a credit card number of a person of majority, MySpace could
store the identification information of a parent of an actual child or
store the identification of a person acting as a minor on the site. 176
If an adult chose to pose as a child for purposes of contacting other
minors and a sexual assault occurred, the adult's credit card infor-
mation would provide identification of a suspect. Finally, at the
other extreme, MySpace could have allowed unfettered interaction
between persons registered as minors and persons registered as
adults.
The Plaintiffs cannot use subsequent improvements to the
safety of MySpace to prove MySpace's negligence at the time of Ju-
lie Doe's injuries. 177 Nonetheless, MySpace acted negligently at the
173. Plaintiffs' Original Petition, supra note 8, at 15.
174. See Age Verification at Social-Network Sites Could Be Difficult, supra note 35
(reasoning that credit card could demonstrate user's age notwithstanding teen-
ager's ability to take parent's credit card and subsequently register for site).
175. For a further discussion of the numbers of persons using social-network-
ing websites, see supra notes 17-19 and accompanying text.
176. For a further discussion of credit card age verification capabilities, see
infta notes 199-202 and accompanying text.
177. See TEx. R. EVID. 407 (emphasizing post-accident improvements are not
admissible to prove negligence). "This rule does not require the exclusion of evi-
dence of subsequent remedial measures when offered for another purpose, such
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time of Julie Doe's harm because it did not bear the cost of the
intermediate position requiring credit card identification for mi-
nors' accounts. Here, the expected cost of the loss is high consider-
ing that MySpace is a social-networking website that foresees both
on- and offline interaction, and exceeds the cost of adequately sepa-
rating minors and adults. 178 Recognizing that the cost of credit
card verification for minors is less than the cost of sexual assaults to
minors, MySpace acted negligently in not implementing these
procedures.
IV. GETTING CREATIVE WITH MYSPACE: ALTERNATiVE THEORIES
OF RECOVERY AGAINST THE WEBSITE
A. Negligent Failure to Warn
Although never raised by Julie and Jane Doe, persons suing
MySpace have a high likelihood of success should they accuse
MySpace of negligent failure to warn. 179 To claim negligent failure
to warn, a plaintiff must prove: "(1) a duty to warn against reasona-
bly foreseeable risks; (2) breach of this duty; and (3) an injury that
is proximately caused by the breach" of the duty.'80 Warnings
must: (1) be reasonably designed to catch the consumer's atten-
tion; (2) include language that is comprehensible and provides a
fair indication of the specific risks involved in a situation; and (3)
be of specific intensity dictated by the magnitude of the risk.'81 Ad-
equacy of warnings is an issue of fact.'8 2
MySpace likely is liable for negligent failure to warn. Factually,
MySpace's warnings are not reasonably designed to catch the regis-
trant's attention; rather, the warnings presented on MySpace's site
as proving ownership, control, or feasibility of precautionary measures, if dis-
puted." Id.
178. For a further discussion of the requirement that a party bear a cost to
prevent a loss if that cost is less than the expected cost of the loss, see supra notes
170-72 and accompanying text.
179. See Plaintiffs' Original Petition, supra note 8, at 1 (listing claims brought
against MySpace including: negligence, gross negligence, fraud, fraud by nondis-
closure, and negligent misrepresentation).
180. Graham v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 350 F.3d 496, 514 (6th Cir. 2003).
181. See Pavlides v. Galveston Yacht Basin, Inc., 727 F.2d 330, 338 (5th Cir.
1984) (citing Bituminous Cas. Corp. v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 518 S.W.2d 868,
872-73 (Tex. Civ. App., 1974) (noting guide for determining whether warning is
adequate in negligent failure to warn claim)).
182. Fyssakis v. Knight Equipment Corp., 826 P.2d 570, 571-72 (Nev. 1992)
(stating that adequacy of warning raises "a genuine issue of fact" in determining
whether product is defective).
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appear designed to escape attention. 183 To explain, MySpace has a
box for all users to "check" to consent to both the Privacy Policy
and the Terms of Service Agreement. 184 To access either of these
agreements, users must actively "click" on the hyperlinks to these
documents. 185 Even when a user does open these agreements, the
agreements are long and difficult to comprehend in their en-
tirety. 186 Fourteen- and fifteen-year-olds likely would have difficulty
reading and understanding multi-page legal documents. These
agreements therefore fail the "comprehensible" requirement of ad-
equate warnings.
The warnings, moreover, do not provide a fair indication of
the specific risks attendant to the use of MySpace. While many of
the injuries attributed to MySpace include persons misrepresenting
their ages and, more specifically, pedophiles' sexual assault of mi-
nors, MySpace makes no specific mention of these potential conse-
quences and instead employs generic, broad language in its
agreements. 187 To warn its younger users of the dangers of its site,
MySpace should employ simpler language, an easier-to-understand
format, and more explicit details regarding the risks of its site.
B. MySpace as Attractive Nuisance
The doctrine of attractive nuisance reasons that, because of a
child's immaturity and lack ofjudgment, a child may not appreciate
the dangers in trespassing on land and may find those dangers en-
ticing.188 With attractive nuisance, the social interest in child safety
183. See MySpace Registration Page, supra note 45 (showing ease in which reg-
istrant can overlook both the Privacy Policy and Terms of Use Agreement).
184. See id. (highlighting ease in which user consents to both Privacy Policy
and Terms of Use Agreement).
185. See id. (showing ease in which user registers for MySpace's services).
186. See MySpace.com Terms of Use Agreement June 15, 2006, supra note 40 ("This
Terms of Use Agreement ("Agreement") sets forth the legally binding terms for
your use of the MySpace Services. By using the MySpace Services, you agree to be
bound by this Agreement, whether you are a 'Visitor' (which means that you sim-
ply browse the MySpace Website) or you are a 'Member' (which means that you
have registered with MySpace.com.)"); see also MySpace Privacy Policy, August 26,
2005, supra note 5 (outlining list of MySpace's and users' rights).
187. For a further discussion of specific instances of sexual victimization of
minors following interaction on MySpace, see supra note 9 and accompanying text.
See also MySpace Privacy Policy, supra note 5 ("MySpace members can view each
others' profiles, communicate with old friends and meet new friends . ) (emphasis
added).
188. See PROSSER, supra note 141, at 364 (noting that it is not customary or
practical to expect parents to always accompany their children).
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overpowers a possessor's ability to make use of the property.189 The
elements for attractive nuisance include: (1) the possessor must
know or have reason to know that children are likely to occupy the
place of the unsafe condition; (2) the possessor should recognize
that the unsafe condition is one which involves an unreasonable
risk of harm to such children; (3) the child, because of the child's
immaturity, either does not discover the condition or does not in
fact appreciate the danger involved; and (4) the utility to the pos-
sessor of maintaining the condition is slight as compared with the
risk to children involved.' 90 While one could argue that attractive
nuisance applies only to land, it is not the land that presents the
danger to the child. Rather, it is the dangerous, enticing structure
- separate from the land - that presents the danger.
In applying the doctrine of attractive nuisance to MySpace,
MySpace knows minors roam the pages of its site. 191 Moreover,
MySpace is aware of the numerous children who have met sexual
predators on MySpace and later faced victimization. 192 Children do
not appreciate the dangers of sexual predators as demonstrated by
their willingness to meet persons much older than themselves of-
fline. 193 Finally, considering the fourth element of attractive nui-
sance, the utility of retaining MySpace's current safety procedures is
slight compared to the potential harm to children, i.e., the risk of
sexual assault.' 94 While historically attractive nuisance has served as
a doctrine regarding the trespass to land, it provides a framework
for law relating to dangerous situations enticing to children.
C. Potential Changes to MySpace's Design
In factually evaluating MySpace, there is disagreement over
whether age verification methods are effective for determining reg-
189. See id. (highlighting struggle within courts to arrive at reasonable com-
promise between the conflicting interests).
190. See id. at 368-75 (listing elements of attractive nuisance and illustrating
policy of balancing society's interest in protecting children with landowner's free-
dom to use land).
191. For a further discussion of numbers of minors frequenting MySpace, see
supra note 35 and accompanying text.
192. For a further discussion of attorneys general's attention to sexual victimi-
zation of minors following initial MySpace interaction with adults, see supra notes
74-75 and accompanying text.
193. For a further discussion of incidents in which minors met adults on
MySpace and later engaged in offline sexual activities with the adults, see supra
note 9 and accompanying text.
194. For a further discussion of the potential changes to MySpace's design,
see infra notes 199-205 and accompanying text.
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istrants' true ages. 195 Current technology allows social-networking
websites to verify adults' ages when the adults enter their credit
card numbers. 196 Students also can verify their ages by listing their
high schools, which subsequently are contacted for enrollment con-
firmation. 197 Experts agree, however, that age verification is very
difficult for minors because minors cannot register for credit cards
and have limited forms of identification. 98 An adult easily can im-
personate a child when registering for social-networking websites as
children do not have methods for proving their ages. It is much
easier, therefore, for persons to prove they are adults on these sites.
Another alternative to the website design would require chil-
dren to pass a quiz - in age-appropriate language and complexity -
- in which children answer questions relating to online safety.
Once a person enters their date of birth, the website can respond
with an age-corresponding quiz. Although this would not solve the
problem of persons misrepresenting their ages, this would provide
more information to users - both young and old - regarding so-
cial-networking safety and responsible online habits. 199 Also, this
would decrease MySpace's potential liability for failure to warn. 20 0
Implementing these changes is inexpensive, as it would require
minimal page additions to the front page of the website.
MySpace also may wish to create two versions of their site: one
site for adults and one site for minors. To register for the adult site,
195. See Age Verification at Social-Network Sites Could Be Difficult, supra note 35
(noting that MySpace met with several companies regarding technologies to im-
prove age verification). IDology Inc. and Sentinel Tech Holding Corp. provide
techniques for verifying registrants' ages by validating addresses, birth dates, and
other information provided by users against public databases, including voting and
property records. See id. (noting alternative methods of age verification).
196. See id. (forwarding registration with valid credit card as one type of age
verification).
197. See id. (positing actions of Zoey's Room, site for girls between ages of ten-
and fourteen-years-old). Zoey's Room charges fifteen dollars per year for online
access and has verified every member's age with a school or youth group. See id.
(noting service's cost and age verification mechanics). According to Erin Reilly,
co-founder of the organization that runs Zoey's Room, "[i]t does cost [money] to
create safe communities." Id.
198. For a further discussion of minors misrepresenting their ages to appear
older on social-networking websites, see supra note 43 and accompanying text. For
a further discussion of adults masquerading as minors on social-networking web-
sites, see supra note 48 and accompanying text.
199. See Age Verification at Social-Network Sites Could Be Difficult, supra note 35
(explaining minors' inabilities to verify their ages). Adam Thierer, a senior fellow
with the Progress and Freedom Foundation notes, "[minors] are not voters ...
[t]hey don't have home mortgages or car loans. Most don't have drivers licenses
until they are [sixteen]." Id.
200. For a further discussion of MySpace's negligent failure to warn, see supra
notes 179-87 and accompanying text.
395
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a registrant would need to provide a credit card number, thus prov-
ing an age of majority. To register for the site as a minor, a regis-
trant would need a parent to enter the parent's credit card
numbers.20 1 While this system will not prevent an adult from creat-
ing a fictitious child account and communicating with other minors
through that account, it will provide MySpace with the credit card
information identifying the adult should the adult initiate illegal
interactions and communications with minors.
V. CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSE TO SOCIAL-NETWORKING WEBSITES
The United States House of Representatives has responded to
the dangers of social-networking websites by recently passing20 2 the
Deleting Online Predators Act ("DOPA"). 203 DOPA, which passed
through the House of Representatives by a landslide vote of 410 to
fifteen, 20 4 requires schools and libraries to block access to commer-
cial websites that allow users to create pages or profiles or to offer
communication with other users via forums, chat rooms, email, or
instant messaging. 20 5 After the vote in the House of Representa-
tives, American Library Association President Leslie Burger stated,
"[t]his unnecessary and overly broad legislation will hinder stu-
dents' ability to engage in distance learning and block library com-
puter users from accessing a wide array of essential internet
applications, including instant messaging, e-mail, wikis, and
blogs."20 6 DOPA's constitutionality is thus yet to be determined.
201. See Age Verification at Social-Network Sites Could Be Difficult, supra note 35
(highlighting offering by Industrious Kid Inc. in which parents submit credit card
numbers to vouch for age of their eight- to fourteen-year-old children).
202. See House Majority Whip Blunt Supports Suburban Agenda, U.S. FED. NEWS,
Sept. 27, 2006 (highlighting passage of bill). House Majority Whip Roy Blunt
stated, "Republicans have taken action to protect children in schools and on-line.
These initiatives reflect the premium that House Republicans have placed on fami-
lies and their priorities." Id.
203. Deleting Online Predators Act, H.R. 5319, 109th Cong. (2d Sess. 2006).
[Rules 13.1, 13.2: Bills and Resolutions]
204. See Rep. Blackburn, Energy & Commerce Committee Take on Internet Child Por-
nography Problem, U.S. FED. NEWS, Sept. 21, 2006 (displaying landslide vote in
House of Representatives).
205. See Debra Lau Whelan, House Republicans Introduce Bill to Thwart Online
Predators, SLJ.com, May 19, 2006, http://www.schoollibraryjournal.com/article/
CA6336267.html (noting that passage of bill would severely limit access to websites,
such as MySpace, that allow public forums and personal profiles).
206. House Passes Bill Restricting Social-Networking Sites, Am. LIBRS., Sept. 1, 2006,
at 9.
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VI. CONCLUSION: LET THE BURDEN FALL ON THE
CHEAPEST COST AVOIDER
Common economic analysis of negligence requires a determi-
nation of who is the cheapest cost avoider: parents or MySpace?20 7
Here, the lowest cost avoider actually is a combination of both
MySpace and parents. MySpace should create and implement a sys-
tem that allows parents and MySpace to work together because
MySpace has information on minors' activities, and parents have
physical control over their children. While Julie Doe spent time on
the computer during her online courtship, Jane Doe had the op-
portunity to warn her child about the dangers of online interaction.
Jane Doe also had the opportunity to ask how and where her
daughter met her date on the night of Julie Doe's sexual assault.
MySpace, however, had the opportunity to implement age verifica-
tion procedures in which parents could register a person as their
child following verification of credit card numbers. Once a parent
has registered their child, the parent should have the control to set
the age limits of persons who can interact with their child. While
recognizing that MySpace has achieved its viral popularity from its
unfettered nature and the freedom it provides, with changes,
MySpace can advertise its status as a place where both parents and
teenagers can safely form new relationships and meet new people.
If both MySpace and parents initiate these measures, MySpace may
no longer be a place of dangers but rather "a place for friends." 20 8
Elizabeth P. Stedman
207. For a further discussion of the requirement that a party bear a cost to
prevent a loss if that cost is less than the expected cost of the loss, see supra notes
170-72 and accompanying text.
208. MySpace.com Front Page, http://www.myspace.com/ (last visited Mar.
16, 2007) (stating MySpace's slogan, "a place for friends").
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